The turn of the twenty-first century witnessed a surprising reversal of the long-observed trend towards the disappearance of second chambers in unitary states, with 25 countriesall but one of them unitary-adopting the bicameral system. This article explores this development by first setting it in the context of the historical evolution of second chambers and the arguments that support this model, and then exploring the characteristics that distinguish today's second chambers from first chambers. A 'census' of second chambers in 2014 is used to provide data on second chambers in federal and unitary states, to facilitate comparison with earlier data, and to distinguish between 'new' and longer-established second chambers. The article concludes that newly established second chambers are concentrated predominantly in political systems where liberal democratic principles are not established, suggesting that the debate over their role in democratic states is set to continue.
INTRODUCTION
Much of the recent literature on democratisation embraces a striking teleology: the notion that historical progress has entailed a steady expansion of democratic institutions, amounting to 'a global surge towards democracy' (LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 1996: 1) and 'a recent dramatic expansion of democracy … opening the way to a more prosperous, peaceful and humane world' (Haerpfer et al., 2009: 3) . This has, however, been accompanied by a growing recognition of the need to distinguish between the holding of elections and the consolidation of democracy: elections, far from undermining autocracies, may assist them in remaining in power (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009 ). This scepticism about elective institutions poses a particular challenge in the study of second chambers of parliament, bodies that have in any case been criticised as 'undemocratic', 'not popularly accountable ', 'unrepresentative' and 'elitist', and as likely 'to obstruct and frustrate the popular will more often than they contribute to constructive, salutary delay' (see Hislope and Mughan, 2012: 113-4 What role does bicameralism play in the world's political systems today? Statistics on the decline of second chambers in the late twentieth century seemed to suggest that its opponents had the upper hand. Periodic surveys by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and others recorded a steady decline of bicameralism, especially in unitary states. The proportion of bicameral parliaments reportedly dropped to 59% in 1961 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1962 12-13), 46% in 1976 (Herman 1976 ), 34% in 1986 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1986 ) and 33% in 1996 (Coakley and Laver, 1997: 35-7 ; see also Ameller, 1966) . This decline has been widely acknowledged. Massicotte (2001: 153-4) , for instance, observed this trend not just at national level but also at subnational level, where second chambers were steadily disappearing (the USA and Australia are major exceptions, with overwhelmingly bicameral state assemblies). But Massicotte also detected a levelling off in this decline in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Shell (2001a: 1) also suggested that the trend towards the elimination of second chambers might have been arrested. Noting the global pattern, Norton (2007: 18) concluded that there was no longer a clear trend towards or away from bicameralism.
This global pattern raises interesting and important questions about the future of second chambers. Is it the case that the tide of decline has indeed turned and, if so, how can this be explained, and what are its consequences? This article aims to address this question by undertaking a 'census' of current second chambers and by exploring the implications of its findings for the comparative study of bicameralism. The data thus generated are insufficient to test rigorously any hypotheses that might help to explain changing patterns of bicameralism, since that would require compilation of comparable data on unicameral systems; but they are sufficient to facilitate a pen-picture of the contemporary state of bicameralism, and to permit a preliminary analysis of the link between bicameralism and democracy.
The article begins by setting bicameralism within its broader historical and theoretical context. It continues with an analysis of contemporary second chambers based on a new data collection extending over 77 second chambers, with a 'census date' of 21 March 2014, addressing two areas in turn: the broad profile of second chambers, and their principle of composition. The last substantive section addresses the political role of second chambers and explores their functions in democratic and non-democratic states.
THE ORIGINS OF BICAMERALISM
The phenomenon of bicameralism is commonly interpreted as an expression of a philosophical commitment to the principle of 'balanced' government that may be traced back to the classical world (Preece, 2000: 68-9; Shell, 2001b: 6) . But in examining the appearance of bicameral parliaments we need to look both at the role of historical accident in accounting for Revival of bicameralism p. 3 the contemporary existence of second chambers, and at the ideological arguments that have been mobilised in their defence.
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Historical evolution
In explanations of the emergence of second chambers, the contribution of the British parliament is generally acknowledged, with its division into Lords and Commons acting as 'the main model for almost all the bicameral legislatures of today, either directly or indirectly' (Preece, 2000: 69) . Whatever its merits as a theory, this interpretation has become a potent 'political myth' (as defined in Flood, 2002: 44) : a widely accepted but not necessarily accurate narrative that purports to explain a particular historical development. It was the strength of the myth of mixed government, not the reality of British bicameralism, that was to have such a profound impact on other countries, whether by imposition, as in Britain's own former colonies, or by serving as a model, as in much of the rest of Europe and in the United States, or, indirectly, as a consequence of the export of the US variant to most of Latin America. Notwithstanding Britain's undoubted contribution to the adoption of bicameralism elsewhere, though, this myth is potentially misleading. British bicameralism was never deliberately designed to match a particular philosophical model, but rather emerged as a consequence of historical accident (Shell, 2001b: 7-9) . In important respects, indeed, widely accepted accounts of the British experience (describing a lower house being steadily democratised, and an upper house that retained its conservative composition while being shorn of power) obscures a much simpler key to the transition from medieval to modern parliaments. The process that took almost two centuries in Great Britain (from about 1832 to 1999
2 ) occurred more precipitously in such countries as France (1789): there, the notion of parliament as a collection of social orders or 'estates' was replaced abruptly by the idea of parliament as comprising representatives of individual citizens.
Rather than seeing early parliaments as potentially including one chamber that would ultimately be democratised, it is more fruitful to see them as forums where the key social groups into which medieval society was legally divided came together: the clergy (internally differentiated between bishops, senior monastic officials and lower clergy), the nobility (also finely graded, from princes through intermediate ranks, to gentry, titled or untitled), and other social groups, such as the bourgeoisie and other urban classes, and, perhaps, certain categories of free peasants (Myers, 1975: 23-9) .
Parliaments varied in the extent to which they were open to all of these groups, and in the formula by which these groups assembled. Originally, in many cases, some or all of the groups came together in a single assembly. The pre-Reformation parliament of Scotland was an example-it brought together the three estates (prelates, lairds and burgh representaRevival of bicameralism p. 4 tives), an arrangement that was redefined after the Reformation but survived up to the Union of 1707 (Goodare, 1996) . This unicameral arrangement was the norm in England until the fourteenth century, when the Commons (representing the gentry and the bourgeoise-the 'knights of the shires, citizens and burgesses') began to meet separately from the Peers (the upper nobility and the upper clergy-the 'lords spiritual and temporal'), with the lower clergy lying outside the parliamentary structure (Patterson and Mughan, 1999b: 2-3; Luther, 2006: 8-9) . A similar development took place in Hungary, where the Table of Magnates became a separate house in 1608 (Temperley, 1910: 86-9) . But the bicameral formula was not the only alternative to unicameralism: the French Estates General constituted a well-known example of the very common tricameral formula of clergy, nobility, and 'third estate', the last corresponding to the English Commons (Marongiu, 1968: 226-8 Elsewhere, the installation of a parliamentary chamber representing all the people progressed rapidly in the early twentieth century (Nohlen, 1969 
Theoretical justification
In the restructuring of the world's parliamentary institutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, historical accident played a major role, but ideology was also significant. For radicals, the ideal of a fully democratised, unicameral parliament was the goal, at least in unitary states. A much-cited judgement attributed to the Abbé Sieyès during the early stages of the French revolution sums up the dilemma: 'if a second chamber dissents from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees with it, it is superfluous' (cited in Marriott, 1910: 1) . 3 This was echoed by later critics, with Jeremy Bentham, for instance, arguing that 'if a second chamber represents the general interest, it is useless; and if it represents only a particular interest, it is mischievous' (Rockow, 1928: 577-8) . For critics of the notion of a powerful second chamber, this was simply an anti-democratic device; it was 'part of the defensive armory of the present property system' and 'a bulwark against the aims of the first chamber' (Rockow, 1928: 589-90) .
While a large number of roles that second chambers potentially fill may be identified (for example, Baldwin, 2001, lists six), these may be grouped into two broad areas, representation and reflection (Norton, 2007: 6-8) . 4 Each of these may be used to justify bicameralism. The concept of representation, as is well known, is complex, and may refer to several rather different approaches to the relationship between office holders and those who place them in office (Pitkin, 1972) . As Wheare (1968: 140-6 ) pointed out, the second chamber may be one where 'special interests' can secure a voice. Such 'interests' may be precisely that-vested interests resisting social reform, yet using their traditional authority to legitimise their position, as in the case of the British House of Lords, especially in the past, and the pre-1918 Hungarian Table of Magnates (Bryce, 1921: 445-8) . Nevertheless, distinctive groups with a potentially important national contribution (such as ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities, persons with special expertise, or underprivileged groups) may be given at least symbolic representation by this means (see discussion in Lijphart, 1984: 90-105) . There is, however, little evidence that members of second chambers share a commitment to such principles of representation, as Bochel and Defty (2012) conclude in respect of the self-perception of British peers. The extent to which chambers vary in respect of representation is explored further below.
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Of 'special' groups that might find representation in a second chamber, regional ones are particularly important. Given the central role played by regional interests in federal states, it is not surprising that a distinctive rationale for bicameralism exists in such cases: while the first chamber represents the people of the federation, the second chamber represents its component territories or member states. The Federalist Papers described the equal representation of states in the US Senate as 'at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty' (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1970 [1787-8] : 316). Much later, Wheare (1953: 92-6) argued that while equal representation of states in such circumstances might not be essential, it was certainly desirable, a view shared by Laundy (1989: 5) . As Fiseha (2007: 139-46) put it, the second chamber in federal systems can represent the diversity of the state, while the first chamber represents its unity. But this formula is not universally applied in federations: Watts (2008: 1) excludes bicameralism as a defining characteristic of federation, and,
although Swenden (2004: 25) argues that 'there is no significant federal democracy without a second chamber', there are recent exceptions to this generalisation, as will be seen below.
The second argument essentially has to do with reflection: the idea that bicameralism promotes a stable legislative programme with high-quality laws (Brosio, 2006) . William Riker (1992) has defended the merits of bicameral solutions, rather than such alternative devices as supermajorities, to problems of collective decision making. Others have pointed to the capacity of a second chamber to take pressure from the first chamber. Walter Bagehot (1928 Bagehot ( [1872 : 95-8), no apologist for second chambers, saw that there were circumstances where they could lighten the burden of work on the first chamber. James Bryce (1921: 450-5) , similarly, pointed out that first chambers were highly partisan and encumbered by so heavy a load that their members had little time to consider legislation, leaving room for a second chamber consisting of members with special expertise. This was the view also of Kenneth Wheare (1968: 140-3) , who noted the capacity of second chambers to bring a less partisan perspective to bear on legislation and to provide special skills. This line of reasoning is not entirely persuasive, however, since a range of means for bringing more expertise into the first chamber may be imagined.
THE GLOBAL PROFILE OF SECOND CHAMBERS
We turn now to an overview of the world's second chambers. This section is based on a dataset that summarises certain crucial features of the world's 77 second chambers on 21
March 2014; its core is reproduced in the appendix, and updates an earlier dataset that reflected the position in 1996, which offers a baseline study for comparative purposes (Coakley and Laver, 1997: 95-8; Coakley, 1997) . Here, we consider two aspects of second chambers:
their overall profile, and their makeup.
A statistical overview
Since the distinction between unicameral and bicameral parliaments is not cut and dried, the first question that needs to be addressed is a definitional one. Some constitutions formally proclaim their parliaments as falling into one category or the other; but there are quite a few borderline cases (Norton, 2004; Luther, 2006: 3-5) . Sometimes, the question is whether the 'chamber' is an intergovernmental institution or a parliamentary body. The European Union, like Germany, identifies a single body as its 'parliament': the European Parliament and the Bundestag (Patzelt, 1999 (Arter, 2000) . These systems are usually classed as unicameral.
For purposes of this article, the Inter-Parliamentary Union classification is used to define the set of second chambers. Of the 77 so categorised, the great majority (52) [ [figure 2 about here]
There is an established mathematical connection between population and size of the first chamber: Taagepera (1972) showed that assembly size is strongly associated with the cube root of the population, and Taagepera On average, second chambers are 45% of the size of first chambers, giving an advantage to the latter when there is provision for joint voting to resolve disputes.
The composition of the second chamber
Unlike first chambers of parliament, where the selection system follows a fairly uniform model, second chambers tend to vary enormously in their composition. The Inter-Parliamentary Union's summary (1986: 16) of the bases of composition of second chambers distinguished six paths: direct election, election by local units, election by the first chamber, election by other bodies, appointment by the head of state, and ex-officio membership; it also identified a seventh (hybrid) formula. Coakley and Laver (1997) , taking account of a larger number of cases, reformulated these, identifying seven principles of representation: direct election, indirect election, appointment, heredity, corporate representation, selection by the lower house, and ex-officio membership, with university representation and co-optation as partial approaches. This classification was followed by other authors (for example, Russell, 1999; Russell, 2000: 29-32; Borthwick, 2001) . In fact, though, this approach may be seen as merging two quite distinct dimensions: the representation criterion narrowly speaking (the set of people or interests whose representation in the second chamber is intended) and the selection formula (the electoral or other arrangements designed to give effect to this principle).
The representation criterion may closely resemble that in the first chamber-the second chamber may also be designed to reflect the views of the population at large. More commonRevival of bicameralism p. 10 ly, though, it is not the people of the state, but the territories which make it up, that are intended to be represented. This is particularly the case in federal systems, where the 'stock type of federal parliament' has been described as having a second chamber where the territorial units are equally represented, regardless of their size and population, and whose powers are equivalent to those of the first chamber (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1962: 4-7). Often, though, there is a compromise between the population and territorial criteria, so that territories are indeed represented, not strictly on the basis of their population, but with a weighting that takes account of population. Sometimes, the representation criterion is more selective: it may be based on social or corporate groups, on elite groups, or on specific privileged components of the population.
The selection formula is similarly varied. The most obvious is direct election, whether on the same basis as the first chamber or using an alternative set of rules. Very commonly, though, election is indirect, with the electorate typically dominated by members of regional or local councils-a formula that, perhaps surprisingly, tends to promote even closer links with provincial interests than direct election (National Democratic Institute, 1996: 7; Russell, 2001: 116) . Third, members of the second chamber may be nominated by the head of state, or they may be appointed by some other means, such as cooptation by the chamber itself, selection by the first chamber or membership by virtue of some kind of ex-officio or hereditary status.
A summary of the manner in which the world's second chambers are composed in respect of these two approaches is given in table 2. It should be noted that in some cases allocation of the chamber to one category rather than another is problematic, and that in 27 cases a mixture of approaches is in operation; the data here refer to the predominant approach. In one case (the Council of the Federation in Russia) two selection formulas, indirect election and appointment, are of equal importance.
[ Direct election. In all, 28 of the 76 second chambers are directly elected. Of these, 10 match the classic criterion of popular representation: the second chamber, like the first, is intended to represent the entire population. Sometimes (as in Colombia, Italy, Paraguay and Uruguay) the most representative electoral system, the party list form of proportional representation, is used for both houses. Romania and Japan use a mixed system for both (with some members elected in single-member districts, a party-list top-up at national level, and, in Japan, some use of the limited vote in second chamber elections). The Czech Republic and Poland use different formulas for the two houses (the list system for the first chamber, and single-member districts using the majority or plurality system for the second chamber). In the two remaining cases, Palau and the Philippines, the unusual block vote system is applied in second chamber elections, with the plurality system and the mixed plurality-list system used respectively in the first chamber.
In an even larger subgroup, however, 16 in all, direct election is used not to represent the population but to represent the territories of which the state is made up: each is equally rep- procedure is not designed to represent the territories on a basis of equality, but a population weighting is introduced. The French Senate, for example, is elected by local councillors to represent départements and comparable units, and the distribution by population is modified by the requirement that each département have at least one senator.
As indicated above, the US model illustrates the principle of territorial equality and direct election in federations. But some federations depart from both of these principles. In Ethio- The kind of nominated second chamber that eventually evolved in the UK had already been installed in parts of the Commonwealth. In eight small states in the Caribbean area, the senRevival of bicameralism p. 14 ates are appointed; the Governor-General (or, in one case, the President) acts on the advice of the prime minister for most appointments, and on that of the leader of the opposition for others. In these cases, provision is sometimes made for appointments based on advice from other bodies, or at the head of state's own discretion (as in Trinidad and Tobago), and similar arrangements are made in other countries, such as Bahrain and Yemen, though with fewer formal restrictions on the discretion of the head of state.
It is difficult to describe the representation criterion in these cases, since members of the second chamber are intended to represent elite groups within the population at large. In (Meisel, 2011: 148-55) . Finally, second chambers sometimes co-opt a portion of their membership: three senators in Mauritania, for example, and 10 in Belgium.
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Other conditions. Whatever the representation criterion or the selection formula, there are at least two other respects in which structural differences between first and second chambers potentially emerge: age and term of office. Bicameral parliaments fall into three categories of more or less equal size as regards age requirements in the two houses. In 24, there is no difference; in 22 the second chamber has a higher age requirement, but this is less than 10 years; and in 25 cases the difference is 10 years or more. Thus, by comparison with the lower house, where 18 is the normal qualifying age for membership, the minimum age in the second chamber is 30 years or more in well over half of all cases (44 out of the 71 where an age limit is specified 
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF SECOND CHAMBERS
We move now from the composition to the political role of second chambers. A first important question concerns their relative power within the constitutional system. The second question relates to their function in the modern state: the nature of their contribution to the political process, and the extent to which their apparent revival may be linked to the process of democratisation.
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The power of second chambers
The power of a second chamber will obviously be in part a function of the power of parliament more generally. Measuring this presents formidable difficulties, though a major initiative designed to survey the strength of parliaments worldwide has yielded important data. Fish and Kroenig (2009) based their research on expert country specialists as well as on constitutional documents, and, using 32 closely defined areas where parliament potentially has a role, offered ratings of the strength of the world's parliaments. Their scores are reproduced in the first column of the appendix, where a high score means that parliament has a role to play in a large number of areas (in Argentina, for example, the score of 0.50 means that in 50%, or 16 out of the 32 areas, parliament possessed specific power).
Comparing the relative strength of the two chambers in bicameral parliaments might appear rather easier, since constitutions normally define the relative powers of the two houses rather
clearly. If we focus on a central parliamentary function, the legislative process, for instance, we will typically find that the second chamber's role is circumscribed, in that its assent to legislation is not necessarily required, and its capacity to influence money bills is less than that of the first chamber. The two chambers may also have exclusive jurisdiction in specific areas that are difficult to compare: the US Senate, for instance, has a particular role in the area of foreign policy and in cabinet and other appointments, the Italian Senate has a powerful role in controlling the executive, and until the creation of the UK Supreme Court in 2009 the House of Lords had a clearly defined judicial function. Furthermore, regardless of constitutional provisions, there may be important differences in practice in the relative power of the two chambers, ones to some degree amenable to measurement (Money and Tsebelis, 1992; Tsebelis and Money, 1997) .
The appendix incorporates an effort to assess the relative power of second chambers, placing them in three crude categories, labelled simply 'high', 'medium' and 'low' in respect of their powers relative to the first chamber. This categorisation is based on three main sources, as described in the appendix, but its very tentative character should be stressed. The 'high' category includes second chambers whose powers are broadly comparable with those of the first chamber; they may even overshadow it, as is arguably the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United States. The characteristic feature is that their assent to legislation is required, and may not be overridden by the other chamber. This is not to say that the second chamber is itself powerful in any absolute sense: in Algeria, for instance, the low overall score for parliamentary power (0.31) suggests that neither chamber is fully involved in the process of government. The 'medium' category is more difficult to define, and to set apart from the categories on either side of it; it refers to second chambers whose legislative veto may be overridden, but only with difficulty (for example, by means of a joint sitting, as in Bolivia). The 'low' category includes the remaining second chambers, whose veto may be overridden by the first chamber by simple majority, as in Ireland and France, or by absolute majority, as in Austria and Spain.
It has been rightly suggested that the power of the second chamber may be related to its selection formula and to state type, with popularly elected chambers and those in federal states likely to be relatively more powerful, though conservative senates in traditional regimes may also possess considerable power (Blondel, 1973: 33) . A study of 12 bicameral parliaments in the Americas, however, has suggested that it is not so much federal status as presidential government that matters (Llanos and Nolte, 2003: 75) , and this may well be the case more generally (Russell, 2012) . The data in the appendix seem to offer some support in respect of associations of these kinds. Thus, 46% of directly elected second chambers are classified here as 'high' in respect of their relative powers, compared to 14% of those elected indirectly, and none at all of those selected by other means.
Directly elected second chambers may be more willing to challenge governments and the reform was reflected in that chamber's much greater hostility to Labour than to Conservative governments. During the era of Conservative rule from 1979 to 1997 the Lords defeated the government on whipped divisions in 8% of cases; but during the following two years of Labour government, before the 1999 reforms, they defeated the government in 25% of cases (computed from Purvis, 2012: 7) . 10 These examples highlight not just the importance of the selection formula, but also of its outcome: the political complexion of the two chambers. Their relationship may vary over time, depending on the extent to which they 'cohabit' under the control of different parties, or collaborate when the same party or coalition dominates both (Scully, 2001 ).
The functions of second chambers
It is clear that the political role of second chambers varies greatly as between federal and unitary states. In the former, the function of territorial representation is so important that it is the absence of second chambers in these cases that requires explanation. In the European On the other hand, when we consider the role of second chambers in unitary states, we revert to the dilemma of Sieyès. If second chambers meet classical criteria of descriptive political representation and possess real political power, they duplicate the role of the first chamber, with which they should, other things being equal, always agree, and thus render themselves redundant. But if they meet the same representative criteria and lack real power, their role is purely ornamental. On the other hand, if the second chamber does not meet conventional standards of popular representation-and, as we have seen, most do not-then finding a role for it in a liberal democratic constitution offers a considerable challenge. If such a chamber lacks real power, then it moves into the 'ornamental' category. But this category is not to be dismissed. There are circumstances where second chambers may be used to isolate and neutralise political groups that would otherwise be menacing-as 'an elegant way to grant immunities to retiring warlords and a return to former constitutional traditions' (Luther, 2006: 8) .
Such homes for hostile but retired or sidelined elites need not, however, be entirely lacking in power; and it is the unrepresentative but powerful second chamber that poses the biggest challenge of all for democratic theorists. Such bodies commonly operate in the guise of institutions designed to correct the potential 'excesses' of the first chamber. As the Federalist Papers put it in the 1780s, a second chamber can be an important component in a system of checks and balances, especially given the propensity of lower houses 'to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions' (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1970 [1787-8] : 316-7). This argument found lukewarm support from John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, when he argued that a second chamber would counterbalance the popularly elected house and prevent it from becoming 'despotic and overweening' (Mill, 1912 (Mill, [1861 : 336). But in the era of modern political parties it is likely that decisions of the lower chamber will be more calculating than hasty, and the case for having another body which could block them in a contemporary democratic state is hard to make. Indeed, the 'checks and balances' argument may simply disguise sectional self-interest. Finer (1946: 677) argued that 'all second chambers have been instituted, and are maintained, not from disinterested love of mature deliberation, but because there is something their makers wished to defend against the rest of the community'. In any event,
there are means other than a second chamber for moderating the potential excesses of a unicameral legislature, with the courts system and a powerful head of state as obvious examples. In probing further, it is important to address a matter that has so far been ignored in this article. In looking at the characteristics of second chambers, formal constitutional and legal provisions have been taken at face value-the only practical approach if extensive subjective judgement is to be avoided, but one that obviously does not reflect reality. It is, however, possible to go some way towards assessing also the likelihood that institutions of this kind will function as constitutionally prescribed. Imperfect though they are, two well-known indices assist in offering a general impression of the extent to which the institutions discussed in this 
CONCLUSION
Recent developments in the evolution of bicameralism offer a challenge to the longestablished body of literature in the area. First, for those wedded to the view that a second chamber is a key institutional component of federal government, it is important to explore why certain federal states have discarded bicameralism-though this development may well reflect a weakening of federal provisions rather than an erosion of the link between bicameralism and federalism. Second, the recent upsurge in the popularity of bicameralism, as measured by the considerable number of unitary states which have adopted it since the mid1990s, poses an uncomfortable question for defenders of second chambers. It may well be the case that these new bodies contribute to an enhancement of the quality of public policy;
but it seems clear that in most cases they have been installed in regimes whose liberal democratic credentials are less than perfect.
In reality, second chambers continue to be essentially 'contested institutions' whose political function is disputed, except in the USA (Mughan and Patterson, 1999: 338-40) . While they may indeed serve an important representative function, they can also be accused of being either decorative (if they are representative and powerless), dangerous (if they are representative and powerful), redundant (if they are unrepresentative and powerless), or reactionary (if they are unrepresentative and powerful). We may be sure, then, that debate about the contribution of second chambers to the modern democratic state is set to continue, at least in respect of unitary states; their value as representative chambers, their effectiveness as legislative institutions and their very existence as constitutional bodies will continue to divide academic analysts and political practitioners alike for the foreseeable future.
NOTES
1 The three sections that follow are a revised and updated version of material that appeared in Coakley, 2013, which was based on a 'census' date of 15 January 2012. Note: In the case of those chambers which make provision for full renewal, the terms above may be either fixed or (if there is provision for premature dissolution) maximum.
Source: Appendix. 1914, 1930, 1947, 1969, 1985, 1996, 2001, 2012 .
Source: Derived from Statesman 's yearbook, 1914 , 1931 , 1948 , 1985 Political handbook of the world, 1930 Political handbook of the world, , 1947 Blondel, 1973; Coakley and Laver, 1997; Patterson and Mughan, 2001 ; InterParliamentary Union, 2012. 
